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Federal  funds  rate  (before  the  crisis)  and  quantitative  easing  (after  the  onset  of  the  crisis)  affects 
changes  in cross‐border claims by U.S. banks across countries, maturities and sectors, and also affects 
changes  in claims by their foreign affiliates. We find robust evidence consistent with the existence of a 
potent  global  bank  lending  channel.  In  response  to  changes  in U.S. monetary  conditions, U.S.  banks 





In  today’s  globally  interconnected  financial  system,  the  effects  of  a  central  bank’s  actions  reach  far 





(2012)),  recent  attention  has  turned  to  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  on  the  supply  of  credit  to 
borrowers located abroad. The rise of global banks, i.e., banks which lend to borrowers cross‐border or 








U.S.  and other  countries. As  such,  the  global banks’  reliance on  these  channels not only  reduces  the 
domestic impact of the bank lending channel of monetary policy, but also spreads U.S. monetary policy 
                                                            
1 Cross‐border  spillovers of domestic monetary policy actions are  receiving  increasing policy attention  in  recent 
years. The Vice Chairman of  the  Federal Reserve System Stanley Fischer  for example  recently noted  that:  “In a 
progressively integrating world economy and financial system, a central bank cannot ignore developments beyond 
its  country's  borders,  and  the  Fed  is  no  exception.  This  is  true  even  though  the  Fed's  statutory  objectives  are 
defined as specific goals  for  the U.S. economy …. And of course, actions  taken by  the Federal Reserve  influence 
economic  conditions  abroad. Because  these  international  effects  in  turn  spill back on  the  evolution of  the U.S. 






markets  (Goldberg  (2007)), the expansion of U.S. bank claims abroad  in times of U.S. monetary easing 
can have beneficial effects on recipient economies. 
While  the  reallocation  of  funds  following  changes  in  domestic  monetary  conditions  has  been 
documented within global banks and between countries,2 3 in this paper we examine the transmission of 
U.S.  domestic monetary  policy  across  other  countries,4  through  changes  in  cross‐border  and  affiliate 




affiliate  flows. We  define  cross‐border  flows  as  changes  in  direct  claims  by  the  bank’s  headquarters 
located  in  the home country on  the  foreign country, while affiliate  (local)  flows are changes  in claims 
acquired by the subsidiaries or representatives of U.S. banks located in foreign countries. 
                                                            
2 Closest  related  to our paper  in  this  respect  is Cetorelli  and Goldberg  (2012), who use U.S. bank‐level data  to 
examine the impact of U.S. monetary policy on global U.S. banks’ foreign lending. As opposed to our analysis that 
studies  the  external  capital  markets  in  detail,  they  focus  on  the  specifics  of  banks’  internal  capital  markets. 
Accordingly, they look at how U.S. monetary policy affects flows between the U.S. parent bank and foreign offices 













on  lending  by  foreign  versus  domestic  banks  in Mexico,  and Ongena,  Schindele  and  Vonnák  (2015)  study  the 
differential  impact of domestic and  foreign monetary policy on  the  local  supply of bank  credit  in domestic and 
foreign currencies in Hungary. However these papers do not assess – as we do – the impact of a domestic monetary 





resultant  differential  funding  constraints  –  less  liquid  or  capitalized  global  banks  exhibit  a  stronger 




banks  in  the  pre‐crisis  period.  This  effect  is  substantially  stronger  for  both  less‐liquid  and  for  less‐
capitalized banks. We also find some evidence that unconventional monetary policy (quantitative easing) 
in  the  post‐crisis  period,  as  measured  by  increases  in  the  Fed’s  purchases  of  Treasury  securities, 
significantly  increases bilateral  cross‐border  flows by U.S. banks. These  results  are  also present when 
studying maturity or target sector‐specific credit flows. Finally, we show that the increases and decreases 













Second,  our  bilateral  financial  flows  data  at  the  bank‐host  country‐maturity  and  bank‐host  country‐
sector level allows us to directly control for changes in conditions that are likely to affect the demand for 
investment by U.S. banks abroad. Since our goal is to identify U.S. monetary policy effects on the supply 
of bank credit  to  foreign countries, our use of a broad set of  fixed effects  to control  for demand‐side 
changes allows for a clearer identification of the bank lending channel (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). 
Third, our data extends to the first quarter of 2013, providing us with a substantially longer time horizon 
to  examine  the  impact  of  U.S.  quantitative  easing  on  the  international  bank  lending  channel  than 
previous  work.  Comparing  the  pre‐  vs.  post‐crisis  periods  using  a  difference‐in‐difference  approach, 
Cetorelli and Goldberg  (2012)  for example document a more  severe  lending  contraction over  time by 
liquidity‐constrained  banks.  Morais,  Peydró  and  Ruiz  (2015)  show  the  expansionary  effect  of  U.S. 
quantitative  easing  on  the  lending  of  U.S.  banks  through  foreign  affiliates. We  study  the  impact  of 
quantitative easing on cross‐border flows while carefully controlling for changes in time‐varying demand‐
side conditions throughout and in the aftermath of the financial crisis. We find some evidence of a post‐
crisis bank  lending  channel,  i.e.,  that quantitative  easing  (measured by decreases  in  the U.S.  shadow 
short‐term rate and the Fed’s sale of U.S. Treasury securities)  increases the bilateral cross‐border flows 




the estimation. Section 5 examines  the period after  the onset of  the  financial crisis when  the Federal 






Our main  specification  describes U.S.  banks’  quarterly  cross‐border  flows  as  follows.  Let  ௝ܻ,௧௜,௡  denote 
bank  j’s holdings of cross‐border claims  in host country  i’s at  time  t. The superscript n denotes either 
target  sector  (private  non‐financial,  public  or  financial)  or maturity  of  the  claim,  depending  on  the 
breakdown of  the data  for a  specific estimation. Then ߂ lnሺܻሻ௝,௧௜,௡  captures  the quarterly  change  (from 
time t‐1 to time t) of the natural logarithm of the cross‐border bank flow of maturity or sector n of bank j 
into host country i. Our specification is as follows: 







ratio,  later  replaced  by  the  capital  to  assets  ratio.  As  in  Kashyap  and  Stein  (2000)  and  Cetorelli  and 
Goldberg (2012), we focus on the cumulative impact of monetary policy changes over the four preceding 
quarters.5  Therefore,  four  lags  of  the  monetary  shock  measure,  the  liquidity  measure,  and  their 
interactions are  included.6 For  the maturity‐specific  specifications, n characterizes  remaining maturity: 
Short‐term  (less than 1 year) or  long term  (over 1 year). For the target sector‐specific specifications, n 
characterizes:  Financial  sector,  non‐financial  private  sector  or  public  sector. Bank  Controls  contains  a 
                                                            
5 The inclusion of four lags of the quarterly interest rate changes ensures that we capture the cumulative effect of 
monetary  policy  shocks  throughout  the  previous  year. While  the  use  of  four  lags  has  become  standard  in  the 








and  the  ratio of  interest plus non‐interest expenses  to  total  assets.  Lastly, Demand Controls  contains 






claims  in host country  i at time t. Then ߂ lnሺܺሻ௝,௧௜  captures the quarterly (from time t‐1 to time t) bank 
flows of bank j’s foreign affiliate in host country i. Equation (2) describes our empirical specification. 
(2) ߂ lnሺܺሻ௝,௧௜ ൌ ߡ ൅ ∑௞ୀଵସ ሺߠ௞ܯ ௧ܲି௞௨௦ ൅ ߰௞ܯ ௧ܲି௞௜ ሻ ൅ ∑௞ୀଵସ ሺߢ௞ܯ ௧ܲି௞௨௦ ൅ ߮௞ܯ ௧ܲି௞௜ ሻ ൈ ܥ௝,௧ି௞ 




















dependent variable ߂ lnሺܺሻ  is observed  for only  those U.S. banks who actively maintain an affiliate  in 
host country i. 
In both Equations (1) and (2), we expect that the direct effect of the U.S. monetary policy shock on bank 
flows  is  negative:  ∑௞ୀଵସ ߚ௞ ൏ 0  and  ∑௞ୀଵସ ߠ௞ ൏ 0.  Our  strategy  for  identifying  an  international  bank 
lending  channel  of  U.S.  monetary  policy  focuses  on  the  sign  of  the  cumulative  coefficients  on  the 
interaction term of the bank’s liquidity ratio and the U.S. monetary policy shock: ∑௞ୀଵସ ߛ௞ and ∑௞ୀଵସ ߢ௞. If 
more  liquidity‐constrained U.S.  banks  change  their  global  financial  flows more  in  response  to  a U.S. 
monetary  policy  shock  than  their  liquidity‐abundant  peers,  we  expect  to  find  ∑௞ୀଵସ ߛ௞ ൐ 0  and 
∑௞ୀଵସ ߢ௞ ൐ 0.  If  U.S.  banks’  local  (affiliate)  flows  in  foreign  countries  exhibit  a  host  country  lending 
channel,  we  would  expect  to  find  ∑௞ୀଵସ ߰௞ ൏ 0  and  ∑௞ୀଵସ ߮௞ ൐ 0.  Lastly,  based  on  the  findings  of 
Temesvary  (2014), we  expect  that  all  else  equal,  liquidity‐constrained  banks maintain  higher  foreign 




Our main dependent variables are  the bilateral cross‐border and  foreign affiliate bank  flows described 
above.  These  variables  are  derived  from  quarterly  bank‐level  data  on  U.S.  banks’  cross‐border  and 
foreign affiliate  claims  from  the  Federal  Financial  Institutions Examination Council  (FFIEC)'s 009a Data 
Report form. A U.S. financial institution is required to report foreign country‐specific claims on this form 
(the  volumes  broken  down  into  cross‐border  and  foreign  affiliate  claims)  if  exposure  to  that  given 
country exceeds one percent of  the  institution’s  total assets, or 20 percent of  its capital. This dataset 
contains  an  unbalanced  panel  of  82  FFIEC‐reporting  banks'  foreign  claims  in  75  host  markets  with 
 8 
 
quarterly  frequency  over  the  2003‐2013  period.9  Cross‐border  claims  and  foreign  affiliate  claims  are 
reported separately for each host country‐bank‐time (i.e., year:quarter) combination.10 For each bilateral 
bank‐host country pair, cross‐border claims are reported in two ways: By remaining maturity (short‐term 
with maturity  less  than one year and  long‐term with maturity over one year) and by  target  sector of 
investment (financial sector, non‐financial private sector and public sector). 
Foreign claims are reported on an ultimate risk basis, i.e., after mandated adjustments for transfer of risk 
exposure.11 U.S.  banks’  cross‐border  claims  are  reported  on  a  gross  basis,  but  foreign  affiliate  (local) 
claims are  reported net of affiliate  liabilities. Therefore,  the bank  level dataset does not allow  for  the 
separate analysis of  liabilities, and the foreign affiliate claim equations are estimated using net  foreign 
affiliate claims as the dependent variable. In addition, as mentioned above the FFIEC 009a reports data 
on claims as opposed  to  loans. As a  result,  the  reported volumes also  include assets other  than  loans 
such  as bonds,  stocks,  guarantees,  etc.; derivate products  are  excluded  from  the  cross‐border  claims 
data however. 
While  a  breakdown  by  asset  type  is  not  available  on  a  bilateral  basis, we  can  use  Call  Reports  data 
aggregated across all U.S. global banks to examine the composition of claims over  time.  In 2004,  total 






(column  1)  plus  ‘Amount  of  Cross‐border  Claims  Outstanding  from  Derivative  Products  after  Mandated 
Adjustments  for Transfer of Exposure’  (Column 3). The  sectoral breakdown of cross‐border claims  is  reported  in 
































12  The  sample  captures  an  active period of U.S. bank mergers.  In order  to  avoid  the problem of big  ‘jumps’  in 
balance sheets due  to mergers,  the  issue  is handled as  follows. First, merger events are  identified based on  the 
FFIEC’s National  Information Center’s  Institution History  feature.  Starting with  the  time of merger,  the merging 








holds  cross‐border  claims  in  ranges  from 1  to 58, with a median of 8  countries. About 25 percent of 
observations  come  from  ‘specialized’  banks,  i.e.,  those with  4  or  fewer  target  host  countries.  One‐
























demand conditions. We  focus on  the  following set of controls: Quarterly change  in  the host country’s 
short‐term interest rate, the exchange rate and the host country’s GDP.14 Data on these variables come 
from  the  IMF’s  International Financial Statistics, OECD's Statistics and  the EIU's Country Data. Data on 
the U.S. target Fed funds rate and the Fed’s holdings of U.S. Treasury securities comes from the website 
of  the  Federal  Reserve.  The  dataset  on  post‐crisis  shadow  short  term  interest  rate  is  constructed, 










using  both  the deposit  to  asset  and  capital  ratios  as measures  of  bank  funding  constraints. While  in 
                                                            
14 In the affiliate lending flows regressions, the inclusion of exchange rate changes and Host Country – Time Fixed 





Fed’s unconventional monetary policy  actions  after  the onset of  the  crisis  in determining U.S. banks’ 
cross‐border flows.  In Table 6, we explore how the impact of U.S. monetary policy differs between the 




changes  in  exposures  in  the  2003‐2007  period.  As  we  move  from  Column  1  to  4,  we  include  an 
increasingly exhaustive set of fixed effects to control for non‐monetary shocks and unobservable factors. 
The results  in Table 2  indicate that an  impact of a 100 basis points decrease  in the U.S. Fed funds rate 
causes a cumulative 6.12 to 7.66 percentage points increase in bilateral cross‐border flows.15 
Importantly, the coefficients on the interaction of the U.S. Fed funds rate change and the bank’s liquidity 
(deposit  to  asset)  ratio  is highly  significant  throughout.  Therefore,  the bilateral  cross‐border  flows of 
















As mentioned above, about 25 percent of observations  in  the  sample  come  from U.S. banks  that are 
specialized  lenders,  i.e., make cross‐border  investments  in 4 or  fewer countries. The  inclusion of these 
banks in the sample may bias our results, since the bilateral cross‐border flows of these specialized banks 
may  be  strongly  affected  by  historical,  cultural  or  ownership  ties  (Paravisini,  Rappoport  and  Schnabl 
(2014)). Therefore,  in Columns 5 through 9 we focus our attention on multi‐country  lenders,  i.e., banks 
with 5 or more bilateral  cross‐border  relationships. We  find  that  the  coefficient on  the  interaction of 
bank liquidity and U.S. monetary shocks remains highly significant, even with the inclusion of increasingly 
exhaustive  sets  of  fixed  effects.  Liquidity‐constrained U.S.  banks  increase  their  bilateral  cross‐border 
flows by 2.79 to 4.76 percentage points more than their liquidity‐abundant counterparts in response to a 
100 basis points decrease in the Fed funds rate. 
In Columns 10 and 11, we examine how our  results on  the presence on an active  international bank 
lending  channel may vary depending on  the maturity of cross‐border  flows. We expect  that quarterly 
monetary policy shocks have a stronger impact on short‐term claims than long‐term flows, as the former 
are  easier  to  adjust  depending  on  liquidity  conditions.  Indeed,  the  coefficient  on  the  liquidity  and 
monetary  shock  interaction  is  significant  at  the  5  percent  level  in  short‐term  flows.  Furthermore, 
liquidity‐constrained banks’  short‐term  cross‐border  flows  respond  5.33 percentage points more  to  a 
100 basis points decrease in the Fed funds rate than the flows of their liquidity‐abundant counterparts. 
In auxiliary regressions, we also explore how monetary policy affects the maturity composition of cross‐
border  lending,17 and  find  that monetary  tightening  in  the US causes a significant shift  towards short‐
term  maturities  in  US  banks’  cross‐border  flows.  Furthermore,  this  monetary  policy‐induced  shift 
towards  short‐term  flows  is  significantly  greater  for  liquidity‐constrained  US  banks.  The  result  that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
cross‐border  specifications.  The  choice  to  do  so  is  validated  by  the  finding  that  our US monetary  transmission 
results are robust to the inclusion of Host Country – Time Fixed Effects (which would pick up any impact that host 
country interest rate changes may have on cross‐border lending flows). When we repeat Models 4 and 9 of Table 2 









bank  lending  channel  in  cross‐border  flows.  Throughout  the  table,  the  monetary  policy  effects  are 
greater  in magnitude than those we obtained using the deposit to asset ratio as the funding constraint 
measure.  While  the  full‐sample  specifications  in  Columns  1  through  4  exhibit  weaker  results,  the 
monetary policy coefficients become highly significant when we control  for the confounding effects of 
specialized lender banks in Columns 5 through 9. These results indicate that a 100 basis points decrease 
in the U.S. Fed  funds rate  leads to a 9.72 to 19.64 percentage points  increase  in bilateral cross‐border 
lending  flows,  and  this  impact  is  significantly higher  for  less‐capitalized U.S. banks. Depending on  the 
specification, a 100 basis points decrease in the Fed funds rate causes a 4.10 to 8.20 percentage points 
greater  increase  in  cross‐border  flows by  low‐capitalized banks  than high‐capitalized ones.  Looking by 
maturity, we observe a similar result as in Table 2: Short‐term flows exhibit a much stronger response to 




Table 4  repeats specifications  (1)  through  (4)  from both Tables 2 and 3, now using the dataset on the 
sector‐specific  cross‐border  lending  flows  (to  the  financial,  private  and  the  public  sectors  of  host 
countries). We continue to see strong evidence of an international bank lending channel, using either the 
deposit  to asset ratio  in Columns  (1) through  (4) or  the capital ratio  in Columns  (5) through  (8) as our 










bilateral cross‐border  flows. This  impact  is significantly higher  for  low‐capitalized banks: A bank at  the 
25th percentile of the capital ratio distribution responds by 0.63 to 1.07 percentage points more to a 100 
basis  points  decrease  in  the  Fed  funds  rate  than  does  a  high  liquidity  bank. All  the monetary  policy 




lending  to  the  non‐financial  private  sector,  followed  by  lending  to  the  financial  private  sector.  As 
expected, the monetary transmission effects are negligible in lending to the public (sovereign) sectors of 
foreign countries. Overall, the results  in Tables 2 through 4 demonstrate a robust relationship between 
U.S.  monetary  policy  and  cross‐border  flows.  The  stronger  impact  for  funding  constrained  banks  is 
consistent with a causal role for U.S. monetary policy. 
Post‐2007 Period 
Our  analysis  thus  far has  focused on  the  time period before  the onset of  the  financial  crisis  and  the 
pursuant recession. In Table 5, we examine the presence of the international bank lending channel in the 
post‐2007 period.19 Due  to  the  low number of post‐crisis observations and  the confounding effects of 
                                                            
19  In  addition  to  splitting  the  data  into  pre‐crisis  and  post‐2007  subsamples,  we  also  repeat  the  Table  2 




to  simple pre  vs post‐crisis‐onset  comparative  analysis  regarding  the post‐2007 period. However, our 
dataset  reaches up  to  the  first quarter of 2013 –  including a  sufficient number of  time periods  in  the 
aftermath of the onset of the crisis to allow for a study of global monetary transmission comparable to 
the  pre‐crisis  analysis.20  Similar  to  Cetorelli  and  Goldberg  (2012),  we  define  the  onset  of  the  crisis 
episode  in  international banking to take place  in the first quarter of 2008 – shortly before the onset of 
the main events of the U.S. financial crisis. 
Two  important  complications  in  studying  the post‐2007 period  in U.S. banks’  global  activities  are  the 
presence  of  aggregate  shocks  which  simultaneously  affected  the  demand  and  supply  sides  of 
international  financial  flows, and  the  increasing  irrelevance of  the Fed  funds  rate as a measure of  the 
stance of U.S. monetary policy. First,  the quick contagion of  the  financial crisis across  institutions and 
borders caused leftward shifts in the supply of credit. Soon thereafter, the real economic effects brought 
on by the drying‐up of liquidity led to leftward shifts of the world‐wide demand for credit as well, while 
central banks around  the world engaged  in aggressive expansionary policy  to  fend off  these negative 





fixed  effects. Where  possible, we  also  include  a  crisis  indicator  variable  for  the  2008‐2009  periods. 












funds  rate are no  longer  informative measures of the stance of U.S. monetary policy  in  the post‐2007 
period. Instead, we examine two alternate measures of the stance of U.S. monetary policy for our post‐
2007 analysis. 
First,  we  employ  Krippner  (2013)’s  shadow  short‐term  interest  rate  in  place  of  the  Fed  funds  rate 
(Columns  1  through  4).21 Our  second  proxy  for  unconventional monetary  policy  is  the  Fed’s  sales  of 




Using  Krippner  (2013)’s  shadow  short‐term  rate  as  our measure  of monetary  policy  in  the  first  four 
columns of Table 5, we find significant monetary policy effects using the capital ratio as our constraint 
measure (Columns 2 and 4). In these specifications,  low‐capitalized U.S. banks (at the 25th percentile of 
capital distribution)  raise  their  cross‐border  flows 2.8  to 3.4 percentage points more  than  their high‐















basis  points  change  in  the  base  interest  rate  –  which  corresponds  to  an  approximately  2  standard 
deviations change in the case of the Krippner short‐term shadow rate. For consistency, we define a unit 
change  in the Fed’s sale of securities as a two standard deviations change  in this measure as well. This 




find  that  low‐liquidity banks  increase  their bilateral cross‐border  flows  in  response to a 30 percentage 
points  increase  in  the  Fed’s  purchases  of  Treasury  securities  (quantitative  easing)  by  0.74  to  8.70 
percentage points more than banks with high liquidity. These results are significant at the 5 percent or 1 




especially  for  funding  constrained banks. While we have  controlled  for  a  large number of bank, host 















  Table  6  reveals  that  by  allowing  for  the  bank  response  to  vary  for  lower  vs.  higher  income 
countries, our earlier results are even stronger. Columns 1 through 4 show that in the pre‐crisis period, 
the  differential  between  the  responses  of  low‐  vs.  high‐capitalized  banks’  flows  to  changes  in  U.S. 
monetary policy is significantly greater in lower income countries than higher income countries in three 
out of the four specifications. In fact, this differential between the monetary policy responses of low‐ vs. 




post‐2007 specifications,  low‐capitalized banks’  flows  to high  income countries decreases 0.31  to 0.68 
percentage points more in response to a 100 basis points increase in the U.S. Fed funds rate than those 











In Table 7, we  study  the  impact of U.S. monetary policy on  the  local  (affiliate)  flows of U.S. banks  in 
foreign countries. Previous papers found a strong positive impact of U.S. monetary easing on the foreign 
affiliate flows of U.S. banks in both the pre‐crisis (Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012)) and post‐crisis (Morais, 
Peydró  and  Ruiz  (2015))  periods.  Because  our  local  flows  data  incorporates  claims  by  affiliates who 
operate as fully chartered subsidiaries  in foreign countries, we also expect that provision of liquidity by 
the host country’s monetary authority (as measured by quarterly changes in the host’s short‐term base 




focus on  the subset of  the  local  flows of multi‐country  (non‐specialized) U.S. banks  in  lowly‐dollarized 
















economically  relevant  given  that  the  average  affiliate  flows  were  equal  to  0.68  percent  during  the 








to  the  subset  of  multiple‐country  U.S.  banks  in  lowly‐dollarized  countries  (while  the  U.S.  monetary 
effects  remain  insignificant).  The  direct  effect  of  a  100  basis  points  decrease  in  the  host  country 
monetary policy rate is as much as a 16.21 percentage points rise in local flows (Column 5). The positive 
monetary  impact  is a significant 12.41 to 13.95 percentage points higher for  low‐capitalized U.S. banks 
than for high‐capitalized ones. The significance of our monetary results disappears once we fully control 
for demand‐side  conditions  in Columns  (7)  and  (8).  This, however,  could be due  to  the  fact  that our 
sample size drops substantially (by two‐thirds) once we move to our restricted sample. 





can  point  to  four  potential  sources  as  to  the  discrepancy  of  our  results.  First,  we  saturate  our 





explicit  controls  for  demand‐side  shifts  would  negate  these  findings.27  Second,  we  include  in  our 
specifications changes  in the host country’s monetary policy rate, both  in  its  level and  interaction with 
bank  liquidity. To  the extent  that  foreign monetary policy  rates move  together with U.S. policy  rates, 
previous work’s findings on the significant impact of U.S. monetary policy on local flows might have been 
due  to  an  omitted  variable  problem.  The  last  two  possible  explanations  pertain  to  limitations  of  our 
dataset. Specifically, the local flows data we construct is based on net local claims. If local claims rise in 





In Tables A.1 and A.2  in  the Appendix, we examine  the  role of U.S. monetary policy on  the extensive 




In Table A.1, we use a  large dataset  including  the balance sheet and  financial data of all U.S.  financial 
institutions over the 2003‐2007 period. Our dependent variable of interest is an indicator that takes on a 
value of 1  if  the bank operates beyond U.S. borders  in  the given period, and 0 otherwise.  In a  set of 
logistic  specifications  described  in  the  Appendix, we  examine  how  this  globally  active  vs.  non‐active 
                                                            






policy,  a  100  basis  points  decrease  in  the  U.S.  Fed  funds  rate  was  associated  with  a  0.30  to  1.21 
percentage points  increase  in  the probability of a U.S. bank maintaining global operations  in  the pre‐
crisis  period.  Given  that  the  sample  probability  is  3.74  percent,  these  are  economically  meaningful 









the  four specifications  (including our most saturated model  in Column 4). The  interaction of monetary 
policy changes with bank capitalization is significant in our two most saturated specifications (Columns 3 











of  U.S.  banks  via  external  capital  markets  between  2003  and  2013.  Specifically,  we  examined  how 
changes  in  the  stance  of  U.S.  monetary  policy  (as  changes  in  the  Fed  funds  rate  up  to  2007,  and 
quantitative easing beyond) affected U.S. banks’ bilateral cross‐border and foreign affiliate flows. Using 
the  identification  strategy  that  funding‐constrained  banks  exhibit  a  stronger  response  to  changes  in 
liquidity conditions than their unconstrained peers, we  find strong evidence that U.S. monetary easing 




post‐crisis  varies  across  lower  vs.  higher  income  countries.  These  findings  are  robust  to  various  data 
specifications, funding constraint measures (i.e., deposit or capital to assets ratios) and the  inclusion of 
exhaustive  sets  of  relevant  fixed  effects.  Some  results  suggest  that  the  extra  liquidity  provided  by 
expansionary  U.S.  monetary  policy  also  contributed  to  U.S.  banks’  decision  to  “go  global”  and  to 
establish local presence in foreign countries. 
Our  contributions  to  the  literature  are  three‐fold.  First, our bilateral  financial  flows data  allows us  to 









the onset of  the  financial  crisis using  comparable empirical models,  and establish  the  strong positive 
impact of quantitative easing on U.S. banks’ foreign flows. 
There  is  intensifying  policy  interest  in  the mechanics  of  the  cross‐border  spillovers  of  domestically‐
oriented macroeconomic policies and their  feedback effects on national economies. As Stanley Fischer 
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Variable Names Definition Unit N Mean SD Min. 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% Max.
Dependent Variables
Quarterly Change in Cross-border US Bank Lending
Aggregate (Pre-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of total 
cross-border claims in the host country in quarter t pre-crisis
% 2,981 2.76 42.98 -199.80 -40.55 -11.51 0 18.23 47.00 194.59
Aggregate (Post-2007) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of total 
cross-border claims in the host country in quarter t post-2007
% 2,001 0.66 37.71 -188.49 -36.77 -11.43 0 13.55 38.78 185.63
≤ 1 Year (Pre-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of total 
cross-border claims with a remaining maturity below one year 
in the host country in quarter t pre-crisis
% 1,781 1.96 42.55 -199.24 -40.55 -11.33 0 16.43 46.44 205.59
≤ 1 Year (Post-2007) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of total 
cross-border claims with a remaining maturity below one year 
in the host country in quarter t post-2007
% 1,333 -1.81 37.86 -188.49 -40.55 -13.35 0 11.39 35.4 187.18
> 1 Year (Pre-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of total 
cross-border claims with a remaining maturity equal to and 
above one year in the host country in quarter t pre-crisis
% 1,754 0.43 28.66 -173.46 -14.8 0 0 0 17.93 203.69
> 1 Year (Post-2007) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of total 
cross-border claims with a remaining maturity equal to and 
above one year in the host country in quarter t post-2007
% 1,359 1.96 33.16 -163.41 -14.9 0 0 1.71 25.13 196.96
To Banks (Pre-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of total 
cross-border claims on the host country`s financial sector in 
quarter t pre-crisis
% 2,285 1.09 43.87 -180.39 -47 -9.53 0 13.32 49.48 199.24
To Banks (Post-2007) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of total 
cross-border claims on the host country`s financial sector in 
quarter t post-2007
% 1,481 -2.09 41.41 -188.49 -43.7 -8.70 0 6.08 39.97 194.59
To Non-financial Private Sector (Pre-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of total 
cross-border claims on the host country`s non-financial private 
sector in quarter t pre-crisis
% 2,297 1.30 35.61 -180.18 -22.31 0 0 4.45 29.73 186.21
To Non-financial Private Sector (Post-2007) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of total 
cross-border claims on the host country`s non-financial private 
sector in quarter t post-2007
% 1,480 0.28 37.18 -202.23 -22.31 -4.43 0 6.45 27.05 192.91
To Public Sector (Pre-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of total 
cross-border claims on the host country`s public sector in 
quarter t pre-crisis
% 2,289 -0.46 16.17 -130.59 0 0 0 0 0 151.98
To Public Sector (Post-2007) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of total 
cross-border claims on the host country`s public sector in 
quarter t post-2007
% 1,498 -0.28 23.54 -159.94 0 0 0 0 0 175.07
Quarterly Change in US Bank Affiliate Lending in Other Countries (Pre-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of net 
foreign affiliate claims in the host country in quarter t pre-crisis
% 1,588 0.68 19.43 -176.34 0 0 0 0 2.93 195.04
US Bank Maintains Affiliate in Host Country (Pre-crisis) indicator variable that equals 1 if the US bank maintains an 
affiliate in the host country at time t, and equals 0 otherwise





US Federal Funds Rate (Pre-crisis) quarterly change in the US federal funds rate pre-crisis % 2,136 0.165 0.427 -0.730 -0.280 -0.170 0.110 0.330 0.910 0.990
Δ Host Country Short-Term Interest Rate (pre-crisis) quarterly change in the host country's short-term base % 1,477 0.0345 0.293 -1.350 -0.270 -0.150 0.020 0.230 0.350 1.270
interest rate pre-crisis
Δ US Krippner`s Shadow Short Rate (Post-2007) quarterly change in the Krippner (2013) US shadow federal 
funds rate post-2007
% 2,136 0.25 0.59 -1.16 -0.49 -0.02 0.27 0.71 1.00 1.38
Δ US Federal Reserve`s Sale of Securities (Post-2007) quarterly change in the Federal Reserve`s sale of securities post-
2007
% 1,125 -2.51 16.19 -37.6 -31.2 -4.5 0 0.5 18.90 21.8
Bank Variables
Bank Deposits to Assets Ratio
All bank deposits divided by total assets % 2,272 58.67 11.89 0.00 49.27 54.49 61.16 66.83 68.65 69.91
≤ 1 Year bank deposits (less than or equal to one year) divided by total assets 
% 1,571 23.00 16.73 0.00 3.76 6.65 22.18 34.91 43.11 68.34
> 1 Year bank deposits (more than one year) divided by total assets % 1,542 4.89 6.60 0.00 0.00 0.19 1.20 8.58 13.55 42.37
Bank Capital Ratio bank capital divided by total assets % 2,136 9.13 5.88 0.00 4.05 6.29 7.82 10.62 15.38 44.83
Bank Total Assets the natural logarithm of total bank assets mln. USD 2,136 8.02 2.44 -0.46 5.64 6.02 7.16 8.83 11.43 14.04
Bank Return On Equity bank net income divided by total equity % 2,136 5.99 9.84 -46.33 0.69 2.18 4.77 8.69 11.84 126.20
Bank Cost Ratio bank expenses divided by total assets % 2,136 3.49 4.86 0 1.06 1.59 2.88 4.04 5.18 93.98
GDP Growth quarterly growth rate of Gross Domestic Product % 1,847 3.85 2.94 -6.46 1.26 2.06 3.32 4.81 7.52 36.06
US and Host Country CPI Inflation quarterly change in the Consumer Price Index % 1,966 3.91 5.46 -2.49 0.91 1.53 2.22 4.10 8.84 62.84
Exchange Rate quarterly change in the nominal exchange rate (expressed as 
the host country currency per US dollar)
% 2,018 -3.75 9.05 -46.77 -12.53 -8.9 -4.94 0.13 7.50 59.50
Predicted Probability that US Bank Lends Across Borders predicted probability that the US bank lends across borders 
(i.e., reports on the FFIEC 009 form), derived from the logistic 
regression in Appendix Table 1
% 58,824 3.74 15.40 0 0 0.001 0.00 0.06 1.52 100
Predicted Probability that US Bank Maintains Affiliate in Host Country predicted probability that the US bank maintains an affiliate in 
the host country (i.e., reports non-zero affiliate claims), derived 
from the logistic regression in Appendix Table 2
% 1,807 12.78 26.93 0.017 0.70 1.20 2.30 5.97 76.98 99.59
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders Selection Bias Correction statistic derived from the logistic 
regression in Appendix Table 1
- 932 0.19 0.07 0 0.03 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Affiliate Presence in Host 
Country
Selection Bias Correction statistic derived from the logistic 
regression in Appendix Table 2
- 1,807 1.49 0.58 1.21 1.25 1.25 1.26 1.29 2.22 3.75
Financial Crisis (2008:Q1-2009:Q4) indicator variable that equals 1 between 2008:Q1 and 2009:Q4, 
and equals 0 otherwise.
0/1 1,519 0.69 0.46 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Share of US Dollar-denominated Foreign Affiliate Claims in Total ratio of all US banks' US Dollar-denominated foreign affiliate  
claims to total foreign affiliate claims in the host country
% 1,393 19.47 17.01 0 2.36 6.75 11.13 34.22 45.80 74.86
Lower Income indicator variable that equals 1 if the host country is below the 
median GDP per capita across all host countries in that time 
period, and equals 0 otherwise
0/1 4,761 0.50 0.50 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]













Included Maturities All All All All All All All All All ≤ 1 Year > 1 Year
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} -7.657 -7.519 -6.119 -8.336 -6.670
[3.574]** [3.362]** [4.228] [1.139]*** [4.571]
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Deposits to Assets Ratio{t-1 to t-4} 0.239 0.242 0.169 0.141 0.144 0.208 0.173 0.128 0.231 0.262 0.262
[0.082]*** [0.077]*** [0.059]*** [0.062]** [0.052]*** [0.090]** [0.093]* [0.048]*** [0.038]*** [0.119]** [0.298]
Σ Bank Deposits to Assets Ratio{t-1 to t-4} -0.002 -0.002 -0.097 -0.177 -0.094 -0.057 -0.069 -0.100 0.003 0.108 -0.247
[0.025] [0.023] [0.130] [0.163] [0.043]** [0.130] [0.113] [0.039]*** [0.133] [0.081] [0.028]***
Constant 36.411 39.264 43.352 68.999 78.567 5.463 12.008 115.695 8.163 -1.827 11.15
[12.769]*** [24.012] [32.044] [51.879] [41.575] [12.134] [14.128] [147.214] [9.220] 15.750] [10.020]
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country - Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes -- -- Yes No No Yes No No No
Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No -- -- Yes -- -- Yes -- -- --
Host Country - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No -- -- No Yes Yes No -- -- --
Host Country - Bank - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No No No No No No
Time Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No Yes Yes -- -- --
Time - Host Country Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No -- Yes Yes
Time - Host Country - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No Yes n/p n/p
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.39 0.387 0.414
Number of Observations 3,113 3,068 3,068 3,068 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 1,125 1,115
5.12 5.18 3.64 3.05 3.13 4.47 3.72 2.79 4.76 5.33 5.92
following a decrease in the US federal funds rate by 100 bps by lower (25%) versus higher (75%) liquid banks:
Note. -- The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities (i.e., credit granted with a
maturity less than one year and credit granted with a maturity over one year). Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values
of Bank Total Assets, Capital-Asset Ratio, Return On Equity and the Cost Ratio. The Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders comes from a logistic regression explaining the bank's
lending across borders (Appendix Table 1 Model [4]). The Multiple Countries sample includes banks active in five countries or more. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for
clustering by maturity are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard
errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the
indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. "n/p" indicates that the set of fixed effects is impossible to include. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%.
Quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities for banks with different liquidity ratios during the 2003:Q1-2007:Q4 period
Table 2
Percentage point change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]













Included Maturities All All All All All All All All All ≤ 1 Year > 1 Year
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} -11.401 -11.255 -10.298 -19.641 -9.715
[4.268]*** [4.308]*** [4.556]** [1.098]*** [0.316]***
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} 0.669 0.672 0.649 0.636 1.474 0.713 0.758 1.476 0.208 0.284 -0.379
[0.400]* [0.410]* [0.444] [0.436] [0.059]*** [0.362]** [0.347]** [0.119]*** [0.541] [0.107]*** [0.487]
Σ Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} -0.370 -0.381 -0.411 -0.364 0.268 -0.318 -0.306 0.400 0.663 0.052 -0.100
[0.325] [0.323] [0.346] [0.285] [0.824] [0.165]* [0.126]** [0.916] [1.295] [0.0124]*** [0.272]
Constant 2.904 11.881 9.498 16.973 0.900 2.387 9.501 3.485 -6.551 10.330 8.620
[8.316] [8.995] [9.440] [9.944]* [27.332] [2.038] [5.216] [20.503] [40.358] [3.424]*** [6.773]
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country - Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes -- -- Yes No No Yes No No No
Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No -- -- Yes -- -- Yes -- -- --
Host Country - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No -- -- No Yes Yes No -- -- --
Host Country - Bank - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No No No No No No
Time Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No Yes Yes -- -- --
Time - Host Country Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No -- Yes Yes
Time - Host Country - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No Yes n/p n/p
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.32 0.31 0.33
Number of Observations 4,216 4,171 4,171 4,171 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 1,672 1,626
3.47 3.47 3.35 3.30 8.18 4.10 4.28 8.20 2.09 2.28 -1.26
following a decrease in the US federal funds rate by 100 bps by lower (25%) versus higher (75%) capitalized banks:
Note. -- The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities (i.e., credit
granted with a maturity less than one year and credit granted with a maturity over one year). Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Bank
Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total Assets, Return On Equity and the Cost Ratio. The Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders comes from a logistic
regression explaining the bank's lending across borders (Appendix Table 1 Model [4]). The Multiple Countries sample includes banks active in five countries or more. Coefficients are listed in the first row,
robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering by maturity are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four
coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the
set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. "n/p" indicates that the set
of fixed effects is impossible to include. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table 3
Quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities for banks with different capital ratios during the 2003:Q1-2007:Q4 period
Percentage point change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]






Assets Capital Capital Capital Capital Capital Capital Capital










Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} -7.947 -7.901 -9.754 -4.388 -4.433 -3.656
[7.524] [7.514] [8.253] [1.047]*** [1.067]*** [1.427]***
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} 0.095 0.096 0.129 0.266 0.194 0.207 0.147 0.117 0.854 1.121 0.093
[0.0347]*** [0.0339]*** [0.0379]*** [0.217] [0.043]*** [0.025]*** [0.041]*** [0.038]*** [0.457]* [0.411]*** [0.558]
Σ Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} 0.0806 0.0771 0.108 -0.0416 -0.499 -0.488 -0.495 -0.513 0.578 -0.284 -0.977
[0.0847] [0.0798] [0.0193]*** [0.000563]*** [0.188]*** [0.193]** [0.201]** [0.193]*** [0.624] [0.178] [0.300]***
Constant -10.35 -6.291 -8.33 -0.783 14.431 9.739 8.293 16.813 18.82 5.188 49.35
[25.53] [22.42] [35.17] [46.31] [1.963]** [1.289]** [1.452]** [4.034]* [32.05] [9.552] [17.35]***
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country - Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes -- -- Yes Yes -- -- Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No No -- -- No No -- -- n/p n/p n/p
Host Country - Sector Fixed Effects No No -- -- No No -- -- n/p n/p n/p
Host Country - Bank - Sector Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes n/p n/p n/p
Time Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time - Host Country Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No No No
Time - Host Country - Sector Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No n/p n/p n/p
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borde No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.129
Number of Observations 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 6,416 6,338 6,338 6,338 1,614 1,589 1,624
2.34 2.37 3.08 6.01 1.01 1.07 0.78 0.63 6.01 7.91 0.61
Quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and sectors for banks with different liquidity or capital ratios during the 2003:Q1-2007:Q4 period
Note. -- The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and sectors (i.e., the non-financial private
sector, the financial private sector and the public sector). Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total
Assets, Return On Equity and the Cost Ratio. The Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders comes from a logistic regression explaining the bank's lending across borders
(Appendix Table 1 Model [4]). Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the sectoral level are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance
levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of
characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider
included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
following a decrease in the US federal funds rate by 100 bps by lower (25%) versus higher (75%) capitalized banks:
Percentage point change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and sectors
Table 4
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]







Σ US Krippner`s Shadow Short Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} 0.078 0.633 -0.208 0.546
[0.165] [0.354]* [0.194] [0.00252]***
Σ US Federal Reserve`s Sale of Securities{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} -0.056 -0.63 0.414 0.167
[0.120] [0.390] [0.180]** [0.053]***
Σ Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} -0.233 0.230 0.306 0.228 -8.7 -1.02 1.971 0.295
[0.329] [0.187] [0.144]** [0.111]** [8.550] [1.350] [8.370] [1.782]
Constant 180.500 5.616 -18.72 -0.283 189.6 16.21 -31.38 0.941
[58.56]*** [32.37] [10.44]* [16.00] [48.50]*** [18.66] [22.61] [24.52]
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country - Bank - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Host Country - Bank - Sector Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.178 0.208 0.175 0.179 0.181 0.203 0.178 0.177
Number of Observations 1,845 2,997 3,722 4,570 1,845 3,016 3,757 4,599
1.53 3.40 -4.41 2.81 -0.90 -3.00 8.70 0.74
Table 5
Quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries, credit maturities and sectors for banks with different liquidity or capital ratios during the 2008:Q1-2013:Q1 period
Note. -- The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities (i.e.,
credit granted with a maturity less than one year and credit granted with a maturity over one year) in Models [1], [2], [5] and [6] or sectors (i.e., the non-financial private sector, the financial private
sector and the public sector) in Models [3], [4], [7] and [8]. Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values
of Bank Total Assets, Return On Equity and the Cost Ratio. The Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders comes from a logistic regression explaining the bank's
lending across borders (Appendix Table 1 Model [4]). Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the sectoral or maturity level are reported in the
row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and
significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that
the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Percentage point change in cross-border US bank lending across countries, credit maturities and sectors following a decrease in the US Krippner`s Shadow Short Rate by 100 bps or a 30 pp
decrease in the Fed's holdings of secturities (this change corresponds to approximately 2 standard deviations for these variables) by lower (25%) versus higher (75%) liquid or capitalized banks:
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]






















Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} -0.0288 0.505 0.489 -0.103
[0.113] [0.0903]*** [0.333] [0.911]
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio  * Lower Income{t-1 to t-4} 0.223 0.386 -0.079 0.482
[0.0078]*** [0.0477]*** [0.019]*** [0.138]***
Σ US Krippner's Shadow Short Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} 0.678 0.473 -0.0422 0.309
[0.0444]*** [0.0868]*** [0.0682] [0.0622]***
Σ US Krippner's Shadow Short Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio  * Lower Income{t-1 to t-4} -0.938 -0.550 -0.0381 -0.163
[0.0316]*** [0.0762]*** [0.0176]** [0.124]
Σ Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} -0.366 -0.483 0.061 -0.010 0.851 0.172 0.16 0.265
[0.124]*** [0.115]*** [0.313] [0.140] [0.00721]*** [0.13] [0.136] [0.0268]***
Σ Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} * Lower Income{t-1 to t-4} 0.254 0.671 -0.136 -0.353 -1.148 -0.331 0.189 -0.485
[0.234] [0.0825]*** [0.216] [0.280] [0.149]*** [0.0887]*** [0.0258]*** [0.0928]***
Constant 66.890 13.15 -1.63 -28.65 230.000 -4.465 -18.43 -6.978
[74.29] [6.53]** [36.77] [48.09] [85.89]*** [44.04] [43.21] [43.42]
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country - Bank - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Host Country - Bank - Sector Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.17
Number of Observations 3,068 4,116 2,272 1,668 1,845 2,997 3,722 4,570
0.63 4.28 1.89 2.29 -1.29 -0.28 -0.39 0.77
0.02 2.82 2.26 0.13 3.23 2.44 -0.2 1.61
Table 6
Quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending in lower income countries, credit maturities and sectors for banks with different liquidity or capital ratios
Percentage point change in cross-border US bank lending in low income countries and credit maturities
following a decrease in the US federal funds rate by 100 bps by lower (25%) versus higher (75%) capitalized banks:
Note. -- The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities (i.e., credit granted with a maturity less
than one year and credit granted with a maturity over one year) in Models [1], [2], [5] and [6], and sectors ( (i.e., the non-financial private sector, the financial private sector and the public sector) in Models [3], [4], [7] and [8]. Table 1
contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total Assets, Return On Equity and the Cost Ratio. The Selection Bias Correction for
Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders comes from a logistic regression explaining the bank's lending across borders (Appendix Table 1 Model [4]). The Lower Income dummy variable included in its level and interactions indicates
countries below the median GDP per capita across host countries in the given time period. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering by maturity and sector are reported in the row below,
and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set
of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed
effects. "n/p" indicates that the set of fixed effects is impossible to include. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Percentage point change in cross-border US bank lending in high income countries and credit maturities
following a decrease in the US federal funds rate by 100 bps by lower (25%) versus higher (75%) capitalized banks:
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]













Σ Host Country Short-Term Interest Rate{t-1 to t-4} -4.007 -4.902 -16.210 -15.400
[2.34]* [3.373] [9.288]* [10.92]
Σ Host Country Short-Term Interest Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} 0.754 0.664 0.369 0.648 2.473 2.784 1.803 2.112
[0.346]** [0.327]** [0.365] [0.332]* [1.34]* [1.515]* [1.538] [1.608]
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} 0.386 6.739
[5.377] [8.833]
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} -0.086 -0.117 -0.147 0.021 0.221 -0.451
[0.278] [0.299] [0.503] [0.602] [0.649] [0.715]
Σ Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} -0.079 -0.097 -0.127 -0.196 -0.285 -0.125 -0.228 -0.437
[0.31] [0.30] 0.294] [0.275] [0.912] [0.809] [0.489] [0.427]
Constant 21.320 18.120 14.86 12.520 35.940 16.010 12.340 -17.130
[16.36] [14.76] [7.735]* [11.49] [68.65] [71.92] [24.12] [105.8]
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country Macro Controls Yes Yes -- -- Yes Yes -- --
Host Country - Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Time Fixed Effects No Yes -- -- No Yes -- --
Time - Host Country Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects No -- Yes Yes No -- Yes Yes
Selection Correction for Observing US Banks Affiliate Presence in Host Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.09 0.101 0.242 0.239 0.101 0.116 0.314 0.300
Number of Observations 1,588 1,588 1589 1,588 509 509 509 509
Percentage point change in US bank affiliate lending in other countries
-0.49 -0.62 -0.79 -0.43 0.56 -2.84
3.88 3.44 1.86 3.25 12.41 13.95 8.85 10.65
following a decrease in the host country short-term interest rate by 100 bps by lower (25%) versus higher (75%) capitalized banks:
Quarterly change in US bank affiliate lending in other countries for banks with different capital ratios during the 2003:Q1-2007:Q4 period
Note. -- The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in US bank affiliate lending in the host country. Table 1 contains
the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total Assets, Return On Equity and the Cost Ratio; the
Host Country Macro Controls include the lagged quarterly changes in the host country's short term interest rate, the exchange rate and the host country's GDP. The Selection Bias Correction
for Observing US Banks Affiliate Presence in Host Country comes from a logistic regression explaining the bank's presence in the host country (Appendix Table 2 Model 4). The Multiple
Countries sample includes banks active in five countries or more. The Lowly-Dollarized Countries sample includes host countries for which the share of non-local currency to total US bank
lending is below the 40 percentile across all countries that US banks lend to. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the sectoral level
are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding
standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not
included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant
at 10%.
Table 7




(A.1) ܩ௝,௧ ൌ ⋀ሾߦ ൅ ߬ܩ௧ିଵ ൅ ∑௞ୀଵସ ߧ௞ܯ ௧ܲି௞௨௦ ൅ ∑௞ୀଵସ ߨ௞ܯ ௧ܲି௞௨௦ ൈ ܥ௝,௧ି௞ 









would  extend  claims  beyond  the  domestic market,  i.e.  if  the  bank  lending  channel  operates  on  the 
extensive margin as well, we expect to find ∑௞ୀଵସ ߧ௞ ൏ 0 and ∑௞ୀଵସ ߨ௞ ൐ 0. A potential explanation for the 
existence  of  such  an  external  bank  lending  channel  is  that  the  liquidity  improvement  that  banks 












Next, we present our  specification  for  the  logistic  estimation of bank  j’s decision  to maintain  a  local 
presence in host country i at time t. Let  ௝ܲ,௧௜  denote an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if bank 
j has an affiliate presence in host country i at time t, and 0 otherwise. 
(A.2)  ௝ܲ,௧௜ ൌ ⋀ሾ	ϐ ൅ ߴ ௝ܲ,௧ିଵ௜ ൅ ∑௞ୀଵସ ϓ௞ܯ ௧ܲି௞௨௦ ൅ ∑௞ୀଵସ ߶௞ܯ ௧ܲି௞௨௦ ൈ ܥ௝,௧ି௞  
൅∑௞ୀଵସ ߸௞ܥ௝,௧ି௞ ൅ ϗ ቀ ܤܽ݊݇	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏቁ௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ϝ ቀ
ܯܽܿݎ݋	
ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏቁ௧ିଵ
௜ ൅ ௝߳,௧௜ ሿ 
Where ⋀  is the  logistic CDF, and  ௝ܲ,௧ିଵ௜   is the one‐quarter  lagged value of the foreign market presence 
indicator variable. The explanatory variables are as defined in the main text. The Bank Controls included 





foreign country that  it already sends cross‐border  investments to, then we expect to find ∑௞ୀଵସ ϓ௞ ൏ 0 
and  ∑௞ୀଵସ ߶௞ ൐ 0.  These  findings  would  be  indicative  of  the  existence  of  an  extensive  margin  bank 
lending channel. A potential explanation  for why U.S. banks’ choice  to establish  local presence abroad 
might be  affected by  the  stance of monetary policy  in  the U.S.  is  that doing  so  enables  the bank  to 
extend  local  flows  in  the host market. Therefore, establishing an affiliate opens up a new channel  for 
bilateral  foreign  investment  in that market. Such new channels might be  increasingly attractive to U.S. 
                                                            













financial  institutions  that  report  on  the  Call  Reports.  Therefore,  the  data  covers  balance  sheet  and 
financial data for over 18 thousand U.S. financial institutions, including commercial banks, bank holding 
companies,  and  edge  and  agreement  corporations.  In  order  to  identify  those  banks with  significant 
foreign exposures, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes on a value of 1 if the bank reports its 
foreign  exposure  on  the  FFIEC  009a  form,  and  0  otherwise.  List  of  Host  Countries:  Afghanistan; 




Liberia;  Luxembourg;  Mauritius;  Mexico;  Netherlands;  New  Zealand;  Nicaragua;  Norway;  Panama; 
Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russia; Saudi Arabia;  Singapore; South Africa; 






Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
US Banks Lending across Borders{t-1} 0.695 2.029 2.356 1.982
[0.192]*** [0.209]*** [0.252]*** [0.197]***
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} -0.301 -1.016 -1.207
[0.054]*** [0.124]*** [0.149]***
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.009
[0.003] [0.006] [0.007] [0.015]
Σ Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009
[0.001]* [0.003]* [0.003]** [0.003]
Bank Total Assets{t-1} 0.029 0.101 0.115 0.112
[0.006]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.014]***
Bank Return on Equity{t-1} -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.01
[0.001]** [0.003] [0.004] [0.006]*
Bank Cost Ratio{t-1} 0.001 0.006 0.007 -0.001
[0.002] [0.004]* [0.007] [0.009]
US GDP Growth{t-1} 0.126 0.418 0.489
[0.075]* [0.190]** [0.222]**
US CPI Inflation{t-1} 0.108 0.351 0.412
[0.027]*** [0.075]*** [0.088]***
Bank Type Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes
Home State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Number of Observations 126,725 37,781 32,098 30,241
Appendix Table 1
US banks lending across borders during the 2003:Q1-2007:Q4 period
Note. -- The table reports estimates of marginal effects (in percent) from logit regressions. The dependent variable is a
dummy that equals 1 if a US bank lends across border in t (year:quarter) and is 0 otherwise. Table 1 contains the definition of
all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Marginal effects are listed in the first row, robust standard
errors are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum
of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported.
"Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or
fixed effects is not included. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
US Banks Affiliate Presence in Host Country{t-1} 19.282 19.426 32.785 32.393
[0.673]*** [0.696]*** [1.443]*** [1.384]***
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} -0.61 -4.994 -11.714 -22.686
[2.030] [2.085]* [9.256] [10.063]**
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} 0.141 0.133 2.43 2.384
[0.121] [0.121] [0.951]*** [0.994]**
Σ Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} -0.069 -0.075 -1.983 -1.856
[0.102] [0.098] [0.461]*** [0.520]***
Bank Total Assets{t-1} 0.989 0.999 0.52 0.158
[0.243]*** [0.248]*** [0.675] [0.705]
Bank Return on Equity{t-1} -0.036 -0.038 -0.143 -0.117
[0.045] [0.045] [0.125] [0.135]
Bank Cost Ratio{t-1} 0.077 0.077 -0.238 -0.228
[0.057] [0.060] [0.117]** [0.119]*
Bank Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Host Country Macro Controls No Yes No Yes
Host Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,711 1,711 750 750
Appendix Table 2
US banks affiliate presence in host countries during the 2003:Q1-2007:Q4 period
Note. -- The table reports estimates of marginal effects (in percent) from logit regressions. The dependent variable is a
dummy that equals 1 if a US bank has an affiliate in the host country at time t (year:quarter) and is 0 otherwise. The Host
Country Macro Controls include the lagged quarterly changes in the host country's short-term interest rate, the host country's
GDP and the exchange rate. Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included
variable. Marginal effects are listed in the first row, robust standard errors are reported in the row below, and the
corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag
terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or
fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. *** Significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
